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ABSTRACT Temporal fault trees (TFTs), an extension of classical Boolean fault trees, can model time-
dependent failure behaviour of dynamic systems. The methodologies used for quantitative analysis of TFTs
include algebraic solutions, Petri nets (PN), and Bayesian networks (BN). In these approaches, precise
failure data of components are usually used to calculate the probability of the top event of a TFT. However,
it can be problematic to obtain these precise data due to the imprecise and incomplete information about
the components of a system. In this paper, we propose a framework that combines intuitionistic fuzzy set
theory and expert elicitation to enable quantitative analysis of TFTs of dynamic systems with uncertain data.
Experts’ opinions are taken into account to compute the failure probability of the basic events of the TFT
as intuitionistic fuzzy numbers. Subsequently, for the algebraic approach, the intuitionistic fuzzy operators
for the logic gates of TFT are defined to quantify the TFT. On the other hand, for the quantification of
TFTs via PN and BN-based approaches, the intuitionistic fuzzy numbers are defuzzified to be used in these
approaches. As a result, the framework can be used with all the currently available TFT analysis approaches.
The effectiveness of the proposed framework is illustrated via application to a practical system and through
a comparison of the results of each approach.
INDEX TERMS Fault tree analysis, reliability analysis, fuzzy set, intuitionistic fuzzy set theory, expert
judgement, temporal fault trees.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, we have seen a widespread use of safety
critical systems in awide variety of industries, including auto-
motive, aerospace, maritime, medical, nuclear, and energy
sectors. Such systems have one thing in common: if they fail,
they can cause great harm to people and the environment.
Accordingly, the reliability of these systems is held to a
higher standard. Reliability is ‘‘the probability that a piece
of equipment or component will perform its intended func-
tion satisfactorily for a prescribed time and under stipulated
environmental conditions’’ [1].
Fault tree analysis (FTA) [2], [3] is widely used for
the reliability analysis of systems. Although fault tree
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Muhammad Imran Tariq .
models are well-structured and easily understood, they
are unable to model some aspects of system behaviour,
e.g., priorities or functional and stochastic dependencies
between events [4]. The modelling capability of classical
fault trees has been enhanced through several extensions,
such as dynamic fault trees (DFTs) [5] and Pandora
TFTs [6]. For instance, in DFTs, dynamic gates like Func-
tional Dependency (FDEP), Priority-AND (PAND), and
SPARE gates are introduced to model the dynamic fail-
ure behaviour of systems. DFTs are primarily analysed
quantitatively and for the analysis of fault trees, espe-
cially the DFTs, different approaches like algebraic [7],
[8], Markov chain-based [9], [10], stochastic [11], [12],
Bayesian network-based [13], [14], Sequential Binary Deci-
sion Diagram (SBDD)-based [15], [16] approaches have been
developed.
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Pandora TFT is another dynamic fault tree extension.
In addition to Boolean AND and OR gates, Pandora TFTs
use temporal gates to capture the time-dependent behaviour
of systems. One advantage of Pandora over other dynamic
extensions of fault trees is that it can be integrated into model-
based design and analysis processes and tools. That means
Pandora TFTs can be synthesised from system models using
popular modelling languages such as Matlab Simulink [17],
EAST-ADL [18], or AADL [19]. Given the advantage of
model-based dependability analysis of systems as described
in [20] and the potential benefits of Pandora in this context,
in this paper, we focus only on this particular extension.
Therefore, although the authors are aware of other recent
developments with other dynamic extensions of fault trees,
for brevity, other developments related to DFTs are omitted
in this paper.
Qualitative analysis of Pandora TFTs allows determining
the minimal cut sequences (MCSQs). MCSQs are small-
est sequences of basic events (BEs) that can cause sys-
tem failure. Methodologies have been proposed in the
past for quantitative analysis of TFTs. Such methodologies
include algebraic solution [21], BN-based approach [22], and
PN-based approach [23], [24]. All these approaches use pre-
cise failure probabilities/rates of system components for the
purposes of quantification. It is generally problematic to col-
lect exact failure rates or probabilities for all the components
of complex and large systems, which can make it difficult to
perform quantitative analysis.
Fuzzy set theory [25] has been developed to handle such
uncertain scenarios by attributing a degree to which a certain
object belongs to a set. It has been widely used for uncertainty
quantification in reliability engineering applications. The first
application of fuzzy set theory with FTA can be found in [26].
In [27], a comprehensive review of the concept of fuzzy set
theory based FTA and their applications was presented and a
review of the applications of fuzzy set theory in system safety
and reliability analysis was presented in [28]. In [29], fuzzy
set theory has been used with a stochastic computational
model for the analysis of fuzzy systems. To acquire uncertain
failure data, expert judgement has been used in association
with fuzzy set theory. For instance, Lin and Wang [30] com-
bined expert elicitation with fuzzy set theory for fault tree
analysis with uncertain data.
In fuzzy set theory, the concept of a membership function
is used to define the degree of membership of a particular
object to a set, i.e., how strongly an object belongs to a
set. In many cases it may not be possible to define this
membership degree with certainty. Classical fuzzy set theory
is not able to incorporate uncertainty or hesitation in the
membership functions. As a potential solution to this prob-
lem, Atanassov [31] proposed the concept of intuitionistic
fuzzy sets (IFS). As an extension to classical fuzzy set theory,
IFS is useful in defining an imprecise quantity using fuzzy
sets where classical fuzzy sets cannot define the quantity due
to the inadequacy of available information. Unlike fuzzy set,
the IFS uses the concept of a non-membership function in
addition to membership function in such a way that their sum-
mation is less than 1 [32]. According to Biswas [33], in many
situations where the determination of degree of membership
of an object to a set with certainty is difficult, the use of
IFS is preferable to handle uncertainty; moreover, in [34],
it was pointed out that the vague set concept coincides with
the IFS concept. As a result, the expectation is that IFS
could be utilised to model uncertainties associated with any
processes and/or activities involving human expertise and
knowledge.
In the past, the IFS concept has been used in reliabil-
ity engineering applications. For instance, Shu et al. [35]
introduced a FTAmethod using IFS. Occurrence possibilities
of BEs of fault trees were represented as IFSs and were
computed through expert elicitation. A vague FTA method
to determine the reliability of a weapon system has been pro-
posed in [36]. IFS has been used by Cheng et al. [37] for reli-
ability analysis of a liquefied natural gas terminal emergency
shutdown system through FTA. The failure possibility of BEs
were represented using triangular fuzzy numbers. These fail-
ure data were collected through expert judgement. Similarly,
Kumar et al. [38] used triangular intuitionistic fuzzy numbers
(IFN) and proposed an approach for reliability evaluation
using IFS. They have also developed FTA using intuitionistic
fuzzy set theory in [39]–[41]. Other researchers [42], [43]
have also developed FTA approaches using IFS theory.
Although the potential applications of intuitionistic fuzzy
set theory in classical static FTA has been investigated in the
past, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, it has not yet been
investigated how IFS could be used with dynamic extensions
of fault trees. In [4], [44], [45], classical fuzzy set theory has
been used for addressing the issue of uncertain failure data
during quantitative analysis of TFTs. These approaches can
only be applied when sufficient information is available to
define the failure probabilities of basic events using classical
fuzzy sets. As a result, when using these approaches it is not
possible to model scenarios where exact knowledge about the
fuzziness of quantitative data is not expressible with a certain
level of confidence. Given the additional uncertainty mod-
elling capability offered by IFS theory over classical fuzzy
set theory, integrating this technique in the TFT quantification
process will open many possibilities.
In this paper, we propose a framework for integrating IFS
theory with expert elicitation to enable the dynamic reliability
analysis of systems through TFTs where exact failure data
of system components are unavailable. In this context the
contributions of this paper include:
• A framework to show how the concept of IFNs and
expert elicitation can be integrated into the TFT quan-
tification process to evaluate the reliability of dynamic
systems.
• A method to use expert knowledge to compute failure
possibilities of basic events (BEs) in TFTs as IFNs.
• Procedure for calculating weightings of the employed
experts using a variant of the fuzzy analytical hierarchy
process, in which together with other attributes (e.g., job
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field, experience, education) the confidence level of the
experts are taken into account for the first time.
• Definition of fuzzy operators for the TFT’s logic gates
to quantify TFT based on the failure probability of BEs
represented as triangular IFNs.
• A process for calculating criticality of events based
on IFNs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes the fundamentals of intuitionistic fuzzy set theory.
An overview of temporal fault tree analysis is also provided
in this section. The proposed framework is described in
Section III. The description includes the intuitionistic fuzzy
data collection process through expert elicitation, formulas
to evaluate the logic gates of TFTs with intuitionistic fuzzy
data, and the defuzzification of IFNs to facilitate the TFT
analysis via PN and BN-based approaches. Section IV pro-
vides a numerical example to illustrate the use of the proposed
framework. Finally, Section V presents concluding remarks
and future research directions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY SET THEORY
Atanassov [32], [46] generalized the concept of fuzzy sets
into IFS by introducing a non-membership value vA˜(x) rep-
resenting the evidence against x ∈ X along with the mem-
bership value µA˜(x) representing evidence for x ∈ X and this
admits an aspect of indeterminacy. This idea appears to be
effective in modelling many practical scenarios.
1) INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY SET
If X is a universe of discourse, then an IFS A˜ in X is given by
A˜ = {〈x, µA˜(x), vA˜(x)〉 : x ∈ X} (1)
where µA˜ : X → [0, 1] is the membership function and
vA˜ : X → [0, 1] is the non-membership function. These
functions satisfy the following condition [47].
0 ≤ µA˜(x)+ vA˜(x) ≤ 1, ∀x ∈ X (2)
For every value x ∈ X , the values µA˜(x) and vA˜(x) represent
the membership and non-membership degrees of the element
x ∈ X to A˜ ⊆ X , respectively. Additionally, the intuitionistic
fuzzy (IF)-index (degree of uncertainty or hesitation level) of
x in A˜ is defined as [47], [48]:
piA˜(x) = 1− µA˜(x)− vA˜(x) (3)
If piA˜(x) = 0,∀x ∈ X , then the IFS is reduced to a normal
fuzzy set.
2) CONVEX AND NORMAL INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY SET
An IFS A˜ in X is IF-convex [49], [50] iff
1) Membership function µA˜(x) of A˜ is fuzzy-convex, i.e.,
µA˜(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≥ min(µA˜(x1), µA˜(x2))
∀x1, x2 ∈ X , 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (4)
FIGURE 1. Intuitionistic fuzzy number.
2) Non-membership function vA˜(x) of A˜ is fuzzy-concave,
i.e.,
vA˜(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≤ max(vA˜(x1), vA˜(x2))
∀x1, x2 ∈ X , 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (5)
An intuitionistic fuzzy number A˜ in X is IF-normal [49],
[50] if there exits at least two points x1, x2 ∈ X such that
µA˜(x1) = 1 and vA˜(x2) = 1.
3) INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY NUMBER
An intuitionistic fuzzy set A˜ = {〈x, µA˜(x), vA˜(x)〉 : x ∈ R} is
called an intuitionistic fuzzy number iff [47]
1) A˜ is IF-convex and IF-normal.
2) µA˜(x) is upper semi continuous and vA˜(x) is lower semi
continuous.
3) Supp A˜ = {x ∈ X : vA˜(x) < 1} is bounded.
A triangular IFN (TIFN) is an IFN with membership func-
tion µA˜(x) and non-membership function µA˜(x) given by
µA˜(x) =

x − a
b− a , a ≤ x ≤ b
c− x
c− b , b ≤ x ≤ c
0, otherwise.
(6)
and
vA˜(x) =

b− x
b− a′ , a
′ ≤ x ≤ b
x − b
c′ − b , b ≤ x ≤ c
′
1, otherwise.
(7)
where a′ ≤ a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ c′. This TIFN is denoted by
A˜ = (a, b, c; a′, b, c′).
B. PANDORA TEMPORAL FTA
In addition to the Boolean gates of the classical FTs, Pan-
dora TFT uses temporal gates such as Priority-AND (PAND)
and Priority-OR (POR) to model the temporal behaviour of
systems. The graphical representation of the logic gates used
in Pandora is shown in Fig. 2. A detailed description of the
behaviour of these logic gates can be found in [24]. In a
logical expression, the PAND and the POR gate is repre-
sented by the symbol ‘C’ and ‘o’, respectively. The AND
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FIGURE 2. Graphical representation of Pandora’s logic gates.
and OR gates are represented as ‘.’ and ‘+’, respectively.
Pandora TFTs can be created through model-based analysis
of systems. For example, using HiP-HOPS [51], a model-
based safety analysis technique, Pandora TFTs can be semi-
automatically generated from the systemmodels [52]. Once a
TFT is constructed, both qualitative and quantitative analysis
can be performed on it. Through qualitative analysis the TFT
is minimised to obtain MCSQs. For quantitative analysis of
TFTs, both algebraic [21] and state-space based [22], [23]
methodologies have been developed.
1) ALGEBRAIC SOLUTION TO TFTs
In an algebraic solution, mathematical formulas are proposed
to quantify the temporal gates.
If the failure rates of the N input events {X1,X2, . . . ,XN }
to a PAND gate are defined as {λ1, λ2, . . . , λN−1, λN }, then
the occurrence probability of the PAND gate at time t is
quantified as [8]:
Pr{X1 C X2 C . . . C XN−1 C XN } (t) =
N∏
i=1
λi
N∑
k=0
[
e(uk t)∏N
j=0
j6=k
(uk − uj)
]
(8)
where u0 = 0 and um = −∑mj=1 λj for m > 0.
The following formula can be used to quantify an POR gate
with N inputs [21]:
Pr{X1 o X2 o . . . o XN−1 o XN } (t) =
λ1
(
1− (e−(∑Ni=1 λi)t))∑N
i=1 λi
(9)
The Boolean AND and OR gates can be quantified using the
following equations.
Pr{X1 . X2 . . . . . XN−1 . XN } (t)
=
N∏
i=1
Pr {Xi} (t) (10)
Pr{X1 + X2 + . . . + XN−1 + XN } (t)
= 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− Pr {Xi} (t)
)
(11)
where Pr{Xi}(t) is the probability of the event Xi at time t .
Note that the above formulas can only be used for the
quantification of TFTs if the precise failure rates of BEs
are available. To allow the use of imprecise/uncertain failure
rates in the quantification process, a methodology has been
proposed in [45] for fuzzy temporal fault tree analysis. In this
method, the failure rates of BEs are considered as fuzzy num-
bers and represented as triangular fuzzy numbers. Formulas
were defined to quantify the logic gates with fuzzy data.
2) STATE-SPACE BASED SOLUTIONS TO TFTs
In addition to the algebraic solution to TFTs, PN and
BN-based approaches have also been developed for the
quantification of TFTs. In the PN-based TFT quantification
approach [23], [24], graph transformation rules are provided
to translate the elements of the TFT to PNs. In the TFT to PN
transformation process, each basic event and logic gate of a
TFT is translated into a sub-net and then all the sub-nets are
combined together to form the PN model of the whole TFT.
For the sake of brevity, a detailed description of the TFT
to PN transformation process is omitted in this paper. How-
ever, for a detailed description, interested readers are referred
to [23], [24]. After the formation of a PN model, the precise
failure rates of system components are used to characterize
the timed transitions in the PN model. For unreliability eval-
uation (e.g. top event probability of a TFT), the PN model
of a TFT can be simulated for a specific mission time using
a continuous model of time. While this approach relies on
precise failure data of system components, recently, in [4],
a framework has been presented showing how classical fuzzy
set theory can be used to address the issue of uncertain failure
data in PN-based dynamic fault tree analysis.
In the BN-based approach [24], a discrete model of time
is considered and a TFT is translated into a discrete-time
BN. This translation is one-to-one, where the basic events of
the TFT are translated as root nodes (the nodes without any
parent) of BN and the logic gates are translated into internal
nodes. As a result, the top event of the TFT is mapped as
the only leaf node, i.e., a node without any children, in the
BN model. For the purpose of quantifying the TFT while
taking the order of occurrence of failure events into account,
the mission time of a system is divided into n intervals.
In order to be able to use the BNmodel of TFT for quantitative
analysis, the root nodes of the BN are assigned with prior
probabilities, which are calculated based on the precise fail-
ure rate of the basic events of the corresponding TFT. At the
same time, the conditional probabilities of the internal nodes
are deterministically defined based on the behaviour of the
logic gates they represent.
III. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The framework proposed for integrating IFS theory and
expert elicitation into the reliability analysis of systems
through TFT analysis is shown in Fig. 3. As seen in the
figure, a reliability analysis using this framework requires
four steps: A. TFT Modelling, B. Failure Data Collection, C.
TFT Solutions, and D. Reliability Quantification. The steps
are explained in the following subsections.
A. TFT MODELLING
This step concentrates on modelling the dynamic failure
behaviour of the system under study using temporal fault
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FIGURE 3. The proposed framework.
trees. In order to do so, the first step is to define the scope
of the analysis. For instance, the analyst has to define which
part of the system is going to be analysed and which part
is omitted. Then it is necessary to determine the contribut-
ing factors and failure events which will be included in the
analysis and which are not. Finally, the level of detail that
is going to be covered in the root causes analysis of system
failure is defined. Once all these are defined, the failure
behaviour of the system is modelled as a TFT. The TFT
development process follows a top-down approach. At first,
a top event (system failure condition) is identified and the
TFT development process starts with this top event. The top
event is decomposed into a number of immediate events that
can cause the top event. Each of these events are modelled
using Boolean and dynamic gates to reflect the combinatorial
and temporal relationships between events. The intermediate
events are decomposed further until the basic events are
reached.
B. FAILURE DATA COLLECTION
For the quantification of the TFT developed in the previ-
ous step, we need to obtain the failure data for the BEs.
Note that, in this paper, it is assumed that the precise fail-
ure data for the BEs are unavailable; therefore, IFNs are
used to represent the failure data of the BEs. As a result,
it is necessary to obtain the unknown failure data of BEs
as IFNs. In this paper, multi-expert knowledge is utilised
to acquire failure possibility of BEs with uncertain data.
As expert knowledge is affected by individual visions and
purposes [53], it is difficult to ensure complete impartial-
ity in expert knowledge. The experts can be from diverse
backgrounds and they can have different levels of expertise
and working experience. For this reason, the weighting
of experts is different; therefore, for practical application,
employing a heterogeneous group of experts is more real-
istic [54], [55]. Several criteria were taken into account
to determine the weighting of an expert, e.g., the work
experience, educational qualification and confidence of the
opinions.
As seen in Fig. 4, the proper utilisation of the expert judge-
ment system involves three main steps: eliciting opinions,
expert weighting, and aggregation. The eliciting opinions
procedure indicates that selecting a proper method to collect
experts’ opinion should satisfy rational consensus principles
like fairness and accountability. In the second step, a suitable
method should be utilised to obtain the relative importance
of the employed experts in order to quantify the weights of
different experts. Additionally, it should help to minimise
subjective bias and improve the accuracy of failure possibility
of each BE as much as possible. Finally, an aggregation
procedure should be applied to combine all expert opinions by
considering their different weights to obtain a single opinion
for further computations. Each of these three step is explained
in more detail below.
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FIGURE 4. The steps of using expert judgment system.
1) ELICITING OPINIONS PROCEDURE
When the failure data collection is difficult or too costly,
expert knowledge elicitation can be considered as means
of data collection [56]. This means that, in certain circum-
stances, expert opinion can be used as an alternative and
useful source of data; however, it should be noted that it
is not a considerable source of rational consensus. There-
fore, an improper methodology will not be able to handle
and contribute to the rational consensus. The five principles
noticed by Cooke [57], including reproducibility, account-
ability, empirical control, neutrality, and fairness, represent an
attempt to formulate a uniformity guideline for using experts’
opinions on expert system science.
In this regard, the Delphi method can be used to acquire the
most reliable opinion of a group of experts [58]. To conduct
a Delphi survey, a group of independent, experienced experts
with relevant background are selected. Questionnaires were
spread among experts and each expert fills the question-
naires by following strict ethical guidelines. All the infor-
mation related to the survey can be communicated through
mail, email, and fax. Such communications may help to
avoid counter-productive negotiations and deviations that
may occur in face-to-face group discussions. After collecting
the opinions from the experts, the data are processed to reach
a consensus. When evaluating the performance of employed
experts, not all detailed behaviour information needed may
be available; but is necessary to satisfy rational consensus
principles like as empirical control, neutrality, and fairness.
Other available methods described in the literature, like the
classical method, can deal with expert opinions, but will not
be able to satisfy all rational consensus principles [59]–[61].
2) EXPERT WEIGHTING
The calculation of expert weighting is a complicated task
due to the large number of judgements required to fully
quantify the relationships and compute the probability of
BEs in large FTs. Thus, obtaining realistic weightings for
the employed experts is important. Experts’ judgments are
subject to bias, especially in expressing their opinions about
large and complex system [62]. Amongmany available meth-
ods, the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) [63] is a popular
method in multi criteria decision making (MCDM). In AHP,
a complex decision-making problem is broken down into
several smaller problems and these problems are formulated
in a hierarchical order to manage complexity. Afterwards,
it is possible to concentrate on the smaller decision prob-
lems at a time to reach to the final decision. The classical
AHP has limited capability to model human thinking and
cognitive process, especially for situations where it is hard
for experts to estimate precise values. To handle these cases,
a new method named the fuzzy analytical hierarchy process
(FAHP) [64], [65] has been developed. Among the different
available variants of the FAHP, the methods proposed by
Buckley [66] and Chang [67] are the two most important
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TABLE 1. The corresponding fuzzy number for relative importance comparison to criterion.
ones. This section gives an illustration of how to use FAHP
to obtain the weightings of the employed experts using the
following stages.
Stage 1: For expert k, after comparing criterion i with
criterion j, the relative fuzzy importance obtained is: a˜kij =
(a˜kij1, a˜
k
ij2, a˜
k
ij3). Using these values, the aggregated relative
fuzzy importance a˜ij is calculated as follows.
a˜ij =
( K∑
k=1
δk .a˜kij1,
K∑
k=1
δk .a˜kij2,
K∑
k=1
δk .a˜kij3
)
(12)
where δk > 0 and
∑K
k=1 δk = 1.
Stage 2: Pairwise comparisons are made between all crite-
ria and a matrix is formed as shown below. Qualitative terms
are used to define the relative importance of criteria.
A˜ = [a˜ij] = [lij,mij, uij] =

1 a˜12 . . . a˜1n
1/a˜21 1 . . . a˜2n
...
...
. . .
...
1/a˜n1 1/a˜n2 . . . 1
 (13)
When a˜ij = 1˜, 3˜, 5˜, 7˜, 9˜ represents a scenario where cri-
terion i is of relative importance to criterion j and a˜ij =
1˜−1, 3˜−1, 5˜−1, 7˜−1, 9˜−1 represents the opposite scenario.
If i = j, then a˜ij = 1.
Table 1 shows the linguistic terms used to represent relative
importance criterion and their associated fuzzy values.
Stage 3: In this stage, the consistency of the fuzzy pair-
wise comparison matrix is examined by assuming that A =
[aij] is a positive mutual matrix and A˜ = [a˜ij] is a fuzzy
positive mutual matrix. According to [66], A˜ = [a˜ij] will
be consistent if A = [aij] is consistent. If there exists any
inconsistency, the weighting evaluation process should be
reiterated to increase the consistency [68].
Stage 4: The fuzzy weights of fuzzy comparison values
between criteria is computed by using the geometric mean
method as follows:
r˜i =
(
a˜i1 ⊗ a˜i2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ a˜in
)1/n (14)
Stage 5: For each criterion, the fuzzy weights w˜i =(
wLi ,w
M
i ,w
U
i
)
are defined as follows [69]:
w˜i = r˜i ⊗
(
r˜1 ⊕ r˜2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r˜n
)−1 (15)
The above fuzzy weight vector can be defined as
w˜i = (w1,w2,w3, · · · ,wi, · · · ,wn)T when the comparison
matrix A˜ shown in equation (13) is perfectly consistent.
Otherwise, the following constrained nonlinear optimiza-
tion model can be solved to determine the weight vectors
of A˜ [70], [71].
min j =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
((
ln wLi − ln wUj − ln lij
)2 + (ln wMi
− ln wMj −ln mij
)2+(ln wUi −lnwLj −lnuij)2) (16)
Subject to

wLi +
∑n
j=1
j 6=1
wUj ≥ 1,
wUi +
∑n
j=1
j 6=1
wLj ≥ 1,∑n
i=1 w
M
i = 1,∑n
i=1
(
wLi + wUi
) = 2,
0 ≤ wLi ≤ wMi ≤ wUi .
The model can be solved using the General Algebraic
Modelling System (GAMS) [72] and the optimal solution
to this model forms normalized fuzzy weights as mentioned
earlier. In this study both types of consistency evaluation are
used.
Stage 6: Defuzzification process. Defuzzification is an
important step in the fuzzy MCDM process, which finds the
best non-fuzzy performance (BNP) value. Different methods
such as mean of maximum (MoM), center of area (CoA),
and alpha cut are available for defuzzification. Out of these
approaches, the application of CoA technique for finding
the BNP is simpler and more practical. In addition, it is
not necessary to take into account the preferences of any
experts [73]; thus, we use CoA for the defuzzification. The
following equation is utilised to obtain the BNP value of the
fuzzy number wi [71].
BNPwi =
(
wUi − wLi
)− (wMi − wLi )
3
+ wLi ,
∀i = 1, 2, · · · , n. (17)
The normalized weight BNPwi is the corresponding weight
of each expert.
3) AGGREGATION PROCEDURE
In this step, the employed experts expressed their opinions
regarding the failure possibility of each BE. The expert judge-
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TABLE 2. The linguistic terms and the corresponding IFNs.
ment on failure possibility of BEs can be acquired by using
linguistic terms provided in terms of IFNs. Table 2 presents
the linguistic terms and their associated IFNs.
As the opinion of experts may vary widely due to their
level of experience and expertise, aggregation of multi-expert
opinion is needed to reach a consensus. Different methods
for aggregation such as arithmetic averaging and the simi-
larity aggregation method (SAM) can be used in this regard.
Yazdi and Zarei [73] discussed the advantages and superiority
of such common methods on conventional fuzzy FTA. In this
paper, an extension of SAM is used for the aggregation
of IFNs. The procedure of this technique in provided in detail
below.
Step A. Transferring linguistic terms to corresponding
IFNs:
Once each expert, Ek (k = 1, · · · ,m) gives linguistic
judgement about the failure possibility of each BE, it is
converted into the corresponding IFNs.
Step B. Computing degree of similarity: The similarity
Suv(A˜u, A˜v) between the opinions A˜u and A˜v of experts Eu and
Ev is evaluated as:
Suv(A˜u, A˜v) =

EVu
EVv
, if EVu ≤ EVv
EVv
EVu
, if EVv ≤ EVu
(18)
where Suv(A˜u, A˜v) ∈ [0, 1] is the similarity measure function,
A˜u and A˜v are two standard intuitionistic fuzzy numbers, EVu
and EVv represent the expectancy evaluation for A˜u and A˜v.
The EV of a triangular IFN A˜ = (a, b, c; a′, b, c′) is defined
as:
EV (A˜) = (a+ a
′)+ 4× b+ (c+ c′)
8
(19)
If a total of m experts is employed then a similarity matrix
is generated as shown below.
SM =

1 s12 s13 . . . s1m
s21 1 s23 . . . s2m
...
...
...
. . .
...
sm1 sm2 sm3 . . . 1
 (20)
where suv = Suv(A˜u, A˜v), if u = v then suv = 1.
Step C. Computing degree of agreement:
The average agreement degree AA(Eu) for each of the
experts is computed as:
AA(Eu) = 1m− 1
m∑
v=1
v6=u
Suv (21)
where u = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
Step D. Computing the Relative Agreement:
The relative agreement degree RAD(Em) for all experts is
obtained as:
RAD(Eu) = AA(Eu)∑m
v=1 AA(Ev)
(22)
where u = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
Step E. Computing Consensus degree:
The aggregation weight (wi) of each expert Ei is the com-
bination of the RAD(Ei) and the weight of each expert BNPwi
obtained by fuzzy AHP.
α  BNPwi (Ei)+ (1− α) RAD(Ei) (23)
where BNPwi is the weight of each expert, α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)
is a relaxation factor, and the operator ‘’ represents the
multiplication of scalar number with IFNs. In this equation,
α illustrates the importance of BNPwi over RAD(Ei). When
α = 0, no weight has been given to BNPwi , therefore, it is
better to employ a homogeneous group of experts. On the
other hand, α = 1 means no weight is given to RAD(Ei).
Yazdi [74] suggested that the consensus coefficient of each
expert is better to be known when the comparative compe-
tency of each expert’s opinion is estimated. Accordingly, it is
important to allocate a proper value of α, otherwise sensitivity
analysis should be applied to analyse the failure behaviour
of system when α has given different value from zero to 1.
To give equal weight to the variables in the equation (23),
in this study the value of α is considered as 0.5.
Step F. Computing aggregation result:
The aggregation result for each BE can be calculated as
follows:
P˜j =
m∑
i=1
wi ⊗ P˜ij (24)
where P˜j is the aggregation possibility of BEj in term of IFNs.
As seen in Section II-B, the quantification of TFT is
performed based on failure rate/probability of the BEs.
Therefore, failure possibilities of BEs obtained from expert
elicitation need to be converted to corresponding failure prob-
ability. This can be accomplished by using the following
formula proposed by Onisawa [75].
FP =

1
10K
, CP 6= 0,
0, CP = 0.
(25)
where FP is the failure probability, CP is the crisp failure
possibility and K =
( 1− CP
CP
)1
3 × 2.301 [75].
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Moreover, for the crisp value based TFT quantification
approaches such as PNs and BNs we need crisp failure
rates and/or probabilities of the BEs. Therefore, we need
to defuzzify the IF failure probability of a BE to a crisp
value. If the IF failure probability of a BE is represented
by a triangular IFN as A˜ = {a, b, c; a′, b, c′}, then it can
be defuzzified using the following formula to obtain a crisp
value.
X= 1
3
[
(c′−a′)(b−2c′−2a′)+(c−a)(a+b+c)+3(c′2−a′2)
c′−a′+c−a
]
(26)
C. TFT SOLUTIONS
In this third step of the proposed framework (see Fig. 3),
for the quantification of a TFT, the analysts can choose
one or more of the available solution techniques for TFTs
as mentioned in Section II-B. If the PN-based approach is
selected, the TFT of the system has to be translated to a PN
model by following the instructions available at [24]. Note
that, as seen in Fig. 3, after the formation of the PN model,
the transition rates of the timed-transitions of the PN model
are annotated by the crisp failure rates of the BEs, which are
obtained in the earlier step.
On the other hand, if the BN-based approach is selected,
the TFT of the system has to be translated to a discrete-time
BN by following the instructions available at [22]. In this
case, the analysts have to decide the number of discrete time
intervals to divide the mission time into and then populate
the prior probability values for the root nodes in the BN
model accordingly based on the crisp failure rates of the BEs.
The conditional probabilities of the internal nodes in the BN
are populated based on the behaviour of the logic gates they
represent.
If the algebraic solution is chosen as a solution technique
for TFT, then the equations (8)-(11) can be used to quantify
the logic gates in the TFT based on the crisp failure rates of
BEs obtained in the step described in the previous section.
However, instead of crisp values, it is possible to directly use
the IFNs for BE failure rates. To use the IFNs to quantify the
TFTs, intuitionistic fuzzy (IF) operators for the logic gates
need to be defined. In order to use intuitionistic fuzzy failure
rates or probabilities in the quantification process, we have
formulated operators for all the logic gates as described
below.
1) INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY PROBABILITY OF AND GATE
If the failure probability of an event Xi, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,N at
time t is denoted by a TIFN P˜i = {ai, bi, ci; a′i, bi, c′i}, then
the intuitionistic fuzzy failure probability of an AND gate
with N inputs {X1,X2, . . . ,XN } can be defined as:
PIF−AND(t) = ANDIF {P1,P2, . . . ,PN } =
{ N∏
i=1
ai(t),
N∏
i=1
bi(t),
N∏
i=1
ci(t);
N∏
i=1
a′i(t),
N∏
i=1
bi(t),
N∏
i=1
c′i(t)
}
(27)
2) INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY PROBABILITY OF OR GATE
The intuitionistic fuzzy failure probability of an OR gate
(TE of fault tree) with N input events {X1,X2, . . . ,XN } can
be defined as:
PIF−OR(t)
= ORIF {P1,P2, . . . ,PN } =
{
1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− ai(t)
)
,
1−
N∏
i=1
(
1−bi(t)
)
, 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− ci(t)
); 1− N∏
i=1
(
1−a′i(t)
)
,
1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− bi(t)
)
, 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− c′i(t)
)}
(28)
3) INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY PROBABILITY OF PAND GATE
If there are N input events {X1,X2, . . . ,XN } with intu-
itionistic fuzzy failure rates λ1, λ2, . . . , λN respectively and
λi, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,N is represented by a triangular IFN
{li,mi, ni; l ′i ,mi, n′i}, then the intuitionistic fuzzy failure prob-
ability of PAND gate with these events can be defined as:
PIF−PAND(t) = PANDIF {λ1, λ2, . . . , λN }
= {l,m, n; l ′,m, n′} (29)
where
l =
N∏
i=1
li
N∑
k=0
[
e(uk t)∏N
j=0
j 6=k
(uk − uj)
]
,
u0 = 0 and uk = −
k∑
i=1
li for k > 0 (30)
m =
N∏
i=1
mi
N∑
k=0
[
e(uk t)∏N
j=0
j 6=k
(uk − uj)
]
,
u0 = 0 and uk = −
k∑
i=1
mi for k > 0 (31)
n =
N∏
i=1
ni
N∑
k=0
[
e(uk t)∏N
j=0
j 6=k
(uk − uj)
]
,
u0 = 0 and uk = −
k∑
i=1
ni for k > 0 (32)
l ′ =
N∏
i=1
l ′i
N∑
k=0
[
e(uk t)∏N
j=0
j 6=k
(uk − uj)
]
,
u0 = 0 and uk = −
k∑
i=1
l ′i for k > 0 (33)
n′ =
N∏
i=1
n′i
N∑
k=0
[
e(uk t)∏N
j=0
j 6=k
(uk − uj)
]
,
u0 = 0 and uk = −
k∑
i=1
n′i for k > 0 (34)
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4) INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY PROBABILITY OF POR GATE
If there are N input events {E1,E2, . . . ,EN } with intu-
itionistic fuzzy failure rates λ1, λ2, . . . , λn respectively and
λi, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,N is represented by a triangular IFN
{li,mi, ni; l ′i ,mi, n′i}, then the intuitionistic fuzzy failure prob-
ability of POR gate with these events can be defined as:
PIF−POR(t) = PORIF {λ1, λ2, . . . , λN } = {l,m, n; l ′,m, n′}
(35)
where
l =
l1
(
1− (e−(∑Ni=1 li)t))∑N
i=1 li
(36)
m =
m1
(
1− (e−(∑Ni=1 mi)t))∑N
i=1 mi
(37)
n =
n1
(
1− (e−(∑Ni=1 ni)t))∑N
i=1 ni
(38)
l ′ =
l ′1
(
1− (e−(∑Ni=1 l′i )t))∑N
i=1 l ′i
(39)
n′ =
n′1
(
1− (e−(∑Ni=1 n′i)t))∑N
i=1 n′i
(40)
D. RELIABILITY QUANTIFICATION
In this final step of the framework, the probability of the
occurrence of the TE of the TFT is computed and the critical-
ity of the BEs is determined. Based on the TFT quantification
approaches selected in the previous step, these computation
processes will vary. In the PN-based method, the TE proba-
bility is determined by simulating the PN model. There are
many tools available to simulate a PN model. In this paper,
we used ORIS Tool [76] to simulate the PN model of a TFT.
In the BN-based approach, a query is run on the BN model
of the TFT to obtain the TE probability. For modelling and
analysing a BN model of a TFT, we modified and used an
open-source tool called JavaBayes [77]. For TE probability
computation using the algebraic approach, the mathematical
formulas provided in equations (27)-(40) are used together
with IFNs. By using these formulas, the system unreliability
is obtained as another triangular IFN.
Importance measures can be used to identify the critical
component. It determines the various contributions of BEs to
the occurrence probability of the TE, i.e., it can determine the
change in the TE probability due to the change in BEs proba-
bility. The results of a criticality analysis can help the decision
makers to improve the dependability of systems by taking
necessary actions such as planning maintenance or upgrade.
Different criticality analysis techniques such as the Birnbaum
importance measure (BIM) and risk reduction worth (RRW)
are widely used [2].
FIGURE 5. Fuel Distribution System of a ship [78].
Here, to rank the BEs in intuitionistic fuzzy TFT, the def-
inition of fuzzy importance measure proposed in [45] is
generalized and is defined as:
If P˜Ti=1 = {a1, b1, c1; a′1, b1, c′1} and P˜Ti=0 ={a2, b2, c2; a′2, b2, c′2} are two TIFNs representing the intu-
itionistic fuzzy failure possibility of the TEwith the BE i fully
unavailable and available, respectively, then the intuitionistic
fuzzy importance measure (IFIM) for ith BE is estimated as:
IFIM (BEi)
=
√
(a′1−a′2)2+(a1−a2)2+2(b1−b2)2+(c1−c2)2+(c′1−c′2)2
2
(41)
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
To illustrate the application of the proposed framework,
we use the TFT of a fuel distribution system shown in Fig.5.
A detailed description of the system and its functional
behaviour is available in [78]. This system consists of two
tanks (Tank 1 and 2), four valves (V1, V2, V2, and V4), three
pumps (P1, P2, and P3), two flowmeters (F1 and F2), a con-
troller, and two engines (Engine 1 and 2). In the normal oper-
ating condition, Tank 1 and Tank 2 are responsible for supply-
ing fuel to Engine 1 and 2, respectively, and the primary fuel
flow paths are ‘‘Tank 1→ V1 → P1 → F1 → Engine 1’’
and ‘‘Tank 2→ V2 → P2 → F2 → Engine 2’’. In the
case of failure, when the fuel flow through one or both of these
primary paths is not possible, the controller can take action
to restore the fuel flow by establishing secondary paths. For
instance, if P1 fails then a secondary path can be formed as
‘‘Tank 1 → V1 → P3 → V3 → F1 → Engine 1’’
by activating P3 and V3 to provide fuel to Engine 1.
In the same way, a secondary path ‘‘Tank 2 →
V2 → P3 → V4 → F2 → Engine 2’’ can be
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FIGURE 6. TFT of the fuel distribution system.
TABLE 3. BEs of the TFT in Fig. 6.
formed to continue supply to engine 2 if P2 fails. As pump
P3 is present in both the secondary paths, it can replace
either P1 or P3 at a time, not both. Therefore, if both P1 and
P2 fail, then at least one of the engines will not get any
fuel. By considering the fuel tanks as completely reliable,
the TFT of Fig. 6 represents the causes of no fuel supply
to Engine 1. As seen in the figure, the TFT contains seven
basic events (represented as circles): X1,X2,X3,X4,X5,X6,
and X7. These basic events represent failure of different
components of the fuel system (see Table 3). The TFT
in Fig. 6 is analysed to obtain following six minimal cut
sequences (MCSQs).
MCSQ #1: X1 o X2 . X3
MCSQ #2: X1 o X2 . X4
MCSQ #3: X1 o X2 . X5
MCSQ #4: X6 C X1 o X2
MCSQ #5: X7 C X1 o X2
MCSQ #6: X2 C X1
Using the Delphi survey, six independent experts were
engaged to provide their opinions about the failure possibility
of 7 BEs (step 1). To determine the occurrence possibility
of a BE, the qualitative terms from table 2 were used and
each expert was requested to provide his/her opinion as a
linguistic term. For instance, in response to the question ‘‘how
TABLE 4. Expert’ opinions and corresponding aggregated IF probabilities
of BEs.
much do you believe that the BE will be in a failed state after
time t?’’, an expert may provide his opinion as VH for failure
possibility.
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TABLE 5. Profile and weighting of selected experts.
TABLE 6. Aggregation calculations for the BE X1.
After collecting all opinions via the Delphi method, FAHP
(step 2) is applied to obtain specific weightings for the
employed experts. Several criteria based on literature and
current case study conditions are considered, including job
field, experience, education level, and confidence level. The
confidence level is one of our new additions as part of the our
IFS framework. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize the
confidence level of the employed experts for further analysis.
The profiles of the selected experts and their weightings are
reported in Table 5. The qualitative terms based on experts’
opinions for each BE, their corresponding aggregated intu-
itionistic fuzzy possibilities, equivalent intuitionistic fuzzy
probabilities and the defuzzified crisp probabilities are shown
in Table 4.
Take the event X1 (Omission of fuel flow through P1 due
to mechanical failure) as an example. According to the defi-
nition of IFNs shown in Table 2, the linguistic terms provided
by six experts fall into ‘H’, ‘H’, ‘M’, ‘H’, ‘H’, and ‘M’ cate-
gories. The integrated IFNs attained and details of calculation
are reported in table 6 (step3).
The data shown in table 4 are used in the TFT quantifica-
tion approaches to evaluate the TE probability. Without loss
of generality, and for the purposes of comparison, the proba-
bility of the TE is calculated for 10000 hours using algebraic,
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TABLE 7. Intuitionistic fuzzy failure probabilities of MCSQs for t=10000 hours.
FIGURE 7. BN model of the TFT of Fig. 6.
PN, and BN-based approaches. Using the intuitionistic fuzzy
probabilities of the BEs and the intuitionistic fuzzy operators
defined for TFT gates in Section III-C, the intuitionistic
failure probabilities of the MCSQs are obtained, and shown
in table 7. Using the equation (28) for intuitionistic fuzzy
probability of the OR gate and the intuitionistic fuzzy data
from table 7, the intuitionistic fuzzy probability of the TE
of the TFT of Fig. 6 is calculated. The values obtained are:
(4.344E-4, 1.381E-3, 4.602E-3; 3.260E-4, 1.381E-3, 6.451E-
3). Using equation (26), the IF possibility of the top event is
defuzzified and the value obtained was 2.484E-3. In addition
to that, we used the crisp values from table 7 and formulas
presented in Section II-B.1 to calculate the TE probability:
1.927E-3.
To compare the results estimated by the IFNs-based alge-
braic approach, the TFT was quantified using both PN and
BN-based approaches. Figs. 8 and 7 show the PN and BN
models of the TFT of Fig. 6, respectively. In the PN model,
the timed transitions (white rectangular bars named in the
form Xi.FR) are annotated according to the crisp failure prob-
ability of the BEs shown in the last column of the Table 4.
Similarly, the crisp failure data for the BEs is used to define
prior probabilities of the root nodes (represented as green
circles) of the BN model. The TE probabilities obtained by
these approaches are reported in the table 8. Note that, in the
algebraic approach, using the triangular intuitionistic fuzzy
numbers and classical fuzzy numbers, the TE probability is
estimated as another triangular intuitionistic fuzzy number
TABLE 8. Comparison of system unreliability estimated by other
approaches with the unreliability estimated by the proposed approach.
and a classical fuzzy number, respectively. On the other hand,
the crisp values are used in algebraic, PN and BN-based
approaches to estimate the TE probability as a crisp value.
Therefore, to compare the results estimated by the fuzzy
approacheswith the results estimated by the crisp value-based
approaches, we defuzzified the intuitionistic fuzzy failure
probabilities and classical fuzzy failure probabilities of the
system. A comparison of the results of different approaches
is shown in table 8. From table 8, it can be seen that the TE
probabilities estimated by different approaches are close to
each other. Although there exist small differences between
the TE probabilities estimated by the different approaches,
the important thing to note is that the use of intuitionistic
fuzzy set theory with expert elicitation enables the analysis in
cases where the available information about system compo-
nents is insufficient to define their failure rate using classical
fuzzy sets.
Based on the intuitionistic fuzzy possibility of the TE of
the TFT, the IFIMs of the BEs are determined using equation
(41). In addition, the fuzzy importancemeasure of the BEs are
also calculated according to the process described in [45]. The
BEs are ranked according to their criticality and the results are
reported in Table 9. As can be seen from the table, both the
intuitionistic fuzzy set based approach and the classical fuzzy
set based approach ranked the basic events in the same order.
In summary, each of the approaches for quantitative anal-
ysis of TFTs have their own strength and weaknesses.
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FIGURE 8. PN model of the TFT of Fig. 6.
TABLE 9. Ranking of BEs based on criticality.
However, most quantitative TFT analysis approaches depend
on the availability of the precise failure data, and if this
is not available, those approaches cannot be used. By con-
trast, the fuzzy set theory-based approach to TFT analy-
sis enables us to evaluate system reliability in the absence
of concrete failure data. Furthermore, the IFS theory-based
method allows us to describe scenarios where knowledge
about the fuzziness of quantitative data is subject to varying
levels of confidence. For this reason, the combination of IFS
theory with expert elicitation as proposed in this paper should
provide more flexibility to the analysts in terms of expressing
failure data as fuzzy numbers. The proposed framework is
therefore more suitable for the quantification of TFTs when
precise failure data are unavailable or insufficient.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a framework for temporal
FTA to evaluate system reliability using intuitionistic fuzzy
set theory where failure data for system components are
unavailable or insufficient. The framework combined IFS
theory and expert judgement to facilitate the collection
of uncertain failure data. Intuitionistic fuzzy operators are
defined to quantify the logic gates in a temporal fault tree
where failure data of system components are represented by
TIFNs. The primary difference of using IFSs over classical
fuzzy sets is that IFSs separate the positive and negative evi-
dence formembership of an element in the set. The efficacy of
the proposed framework has been illustrated via a numerical
example. The experiments show that the intuitionistic fuzzy
TFT analysis approach provides a useful means of dynamic
reliability evaluation when the fuzziness in the failure data
cannot be expressed with high confidence.
In the future, we plan to explore the effects of differ-
ent choices of membership functions, non-membership func-
tions, and expert opinions on the system reliability approxi-
mated by the IFS-based TFT analysis approach. In addition,
in the current study, the value of relaxation factor is assumed
to be 0.5. As the amount of relaxation may have significant
influence on the final results, it is imperative to apply a
sensitivity analysis by varying the value of relaxation factor
from 0 to 1 to understand the behaviour of the results. Indeed,
it can lead to further investigation on how decision-makers
can consider a viable and appropriate relaxation factor for
their system under study.
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